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The solidly entrenched, though little discussed, judicial principle
that the government cannot be estopped in criminal actions' is now
subject to some doubt. In Raley v. Ohio2 and Cox v. Louisiana,a the
Supreme Court reversed a number of criminal convictions because
the defendants had relied upon the advice of state officials that they
were acting within the law. The majority opinions made these cases
out as a variation of entrapment, but the facts differed significantly
from the typical entrapment situation.4 The officials in Raley and Cox
1. See, e.g., Carolina-Virginia Racing Ass'n v. Cahoon, 214 F.2d 830, 832 (,4tih Cir. 1954);
United States v. Associated Gen. Contractors of America, 238 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. La 1964),
rev'd per curiam, 382 U.S. 17 (1965); Commonwealth v. Malco-Memphis Theatres, 293 Ky.
531, 169 SAV.2d 596 (1943); Western Surgical Supply Co. v. Afieck, 110 Cal. App. 21 388.
392, 242 P.2d 929, 931-32 (Cal. 1952); 28 Am. JUR. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 126 (1966); I1
C.J.S., Estoppel § 140(c) (1964), and cases cited therein; cf. United States v. Socony-Vatuuln
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 15 (1940). But see United States v. Davis, 272 F.2d 149, 153 (7th Cir. 1959),
where the court denied that estoppel applies in the circumstances of that case but
specifically refrained from saying that estoppel can never apply in a crimi'nal action. The
usual rationale given is that "the application of estoppel against the State Is particularly
inappropriate in areas such as criminal prosecution, where the welfare and safety of the
community are the paramount considerations." State v. Abbott, 64 N.J. 131, 133, 165 A.2d
537, 543 (1960). (The question there was one of collateral estoppel but the rationale used
against equitable estoppel is the same.)
In an aside, Newman, Should Official Advice Be Reliable?-Proposals as to .toppel and
Related Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 374 (1953) states: ". . . good
faith reliance on agency rulings will probably keep a man out of jail ....... his optimism
seems completely unwarranted, however, as the support Newman musters for it suggests.
More accurate is the observation of Hall & Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U.
CHS. L. REv'. 641, 677 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Hall & Seligman] that "[T1he proposed
defense is muc wider than that recognized by most courts."
2. 360 U.S. 423 (1959). The appellants had relied on the privilege against self-incrimina.
tion when questioned by a commission of the Ohio legislature. Despite the fact that the
commission assured the appellants that they had a right to silence, the Supreme Court
of Ohio affirmed their contempt convictions on the theory that a state immunity statute
deprived them of the privilege. State of Ohio v. Raley, 164 Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E.2d 101
(1956). The United States Supreme Court reversed. All eight justices participating agreed
as to three of the four appellants:
We hold that in the circumstances of these cases, the judgments of the Ohio Supreme
Court affirming the convictions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and must be reversed.... After the Commission, speaking for the State,
acted as it did, to sustain the Ohio Supreme Court's judgment would be to sanction
an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State-convicting a citizen for exercising a
privilege which tl~e State had clearly told him was available to him.
360 U.S. 425-26. Four justices voted to affirm the conviction of appellant Stern since Stern
had refused to answer the question, "Where do you reside, Mr. Stern?" and persisted in
his refusal when directed by the commission to answer the question. Thus Stern's con-
viction was affirmed by an evenly divided court. Id. at 444.
3. 379 U.S. 559 (1965). The Chief of Police of Baton Rouge "gave permission" to Cox,
the leader of a demonstration involving over 2000 persons, to proceed to a point across
the street from a courthouse where a group of arrested demonstrators were being held.
A Louisiana statute prohibited picketing "near" a courthouse. LA. REv. S rAT. § 11,101
(Cum. Sup. 1962). Cox was convicted under the statute, but the Court reversed finding
the same "active misleading," 360 U.S. at 438, that was dispositive in Raley.
4. The Supreme Court first addressed itself to the entrapment doctrine in Sorrells v.
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were known by the defendants to be government agents and had no
design to deceive and entrap the defendants, nor did they persuade
the defendants to commit the criminal acts. 5 Instead, they merely gave
their honest opinion that what the defendants proposed to do was not
unlawful. While the entrapment doctrine rests at least in part on the
need to control undesirable police practices," the Raley and Cox hold-
United States, 287 US. 435 (1932), and propounded a two-fold test for tile defense: (1)
the crime is the product of the creative activity of the government agents which defen-
dant was induced to participate in; and (2) the defendant did not have a criminal pre-
disposition or design. Id. at 451. They stated that tie true basis for the defense was stat-
utory interpretation:
We are not forced by the letter to do violence to the spirit and purpose of the
statute . .. If the requirements of the highest public policy in the maintenance of
the integrity of administration would preclude the enforcement of the statute in
such. circumstances as are present here, the same considerations would justify tie
conclusion that the case lies outside the purview of the Act and that its general words
should not be construed to demand a proceeding at once inconsistent with that policy
and abhorrent to the sense of justice.
Id. at 448-49. This view was followed in the latest entrapment decision b) the Court.
Sherman v. United States, 356 US. 369 (1957). But see note 6 infra.
See generally Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Pro-
vocateurs, 60 YALE LJ. 1091 (1951); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encour-
agenent, 49 VA. L. REv. 871 (1963); Note, Entrapment, 73 HARv. L. RE%. 1333 (1960):
Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me 'and I Did Eat, The Constitutional Status of the Entrap-
ment Defense, 74 YALE LJ. 942 (1965).'
5. In Sorrells and Sherman, the entrapment cases discussed in note 4 supra, tile gov.
ernment agents were involved in the practice of encouraging or inducing criminal con-
duct by the defendant through undercover informers. This is in stark contrast to tile
facts presented in Cox and Raley where tie defendants sought advice, or receiscd it
gratuitously, from state officials as to the proper course of action to be followed in the
situation presented at the time.
6. The proper rationale for tile entrapment defense has been disputed. Sorrells v.
United States, .287 U.S. 435, 456-57 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring): Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 381 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Both concurrences held that
the proper basis for the defense was tie inherent power of the judiciary to protect the
courts from the degradation of convicting persons who had been induced to commit illegal
acts. In Sherman, Frankfurter states that this power derives from tile Court's "supervisory
jurisdiction over the administration of criminal justice." 356 U.S. at 381. This view im-
plies that the purpose of the defense is control of police solicitation tactics. On balance.
the concurrence's view is more reasonable than the legislative intent position adopted by
the majorities. See note 4 supra. Legislative intent on the issue is problematic. The legis-
lature wanted simply to prohibit certain conduct, conduct in which the defendant en-
gaged. The fundamental issue has nothing to do with the defendant's Culpability.
The defendant whose crime results from an entrapment is neither less reprehensible
or dangerous nor more reformable or deterrable than other defendants who are
properly convicted. Defendants who are aided, deceived or persuaded by police officials
stand in the same moral position as those who are aided, deceived or persuaded by
other persons. It is the attempt to deter wrongful conduct on the part of the govern.
ment that provides the justification for the defense of entrapment not the innocence
of the defendant.
'MODL PENAL CODE § 2.10 at 14, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). This recognition
that the integrity of the criminal process is at stake implies that entrapment is a defene
of constitutional proportions under the due process clause. See Note, 74 YALE L.J. 942,
945 (1965), compare the language used by both groups in Sherman and Sorrells with that
used in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169, 173 (1952). Since the legitimate goal of
law enforcement practices is the prevention and detection of anti-social conduct, not the
solicitation, inducement or creation of anti-social acts, a "less restrictive alternative" model
demonstrates the need for constitutional restraints on such police practices. See Note, 74
YALE L.J. 942, 945-47 (1965) for a discussion of tlke legitimate state goal in the entrap-
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ings reflect only an elemental notion of fairness: the individual must
have fair warning of what conduct the government intends to punish.
7
Ordinarily, of course, a "mistake of law" is no answer to a criminal
charge.8 The policies underlying the penal law are thought sufficiently
serious that the citizen must be at his peril to know the law and obey
it. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court on numerous occasions has found
constitutional objections to criminal laws which did not express the
proscribed conduct with minimal clarity.10 Moreover, the long-standing
ment practice. For a comprehensive analysis of the use of the due process clause to protect
fundamental social values by insisting on a socially useful purpose and the least intrusive
methods of all state action, see Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 110 U.
PA. L. REV. 1048, 1075-89 (1968). One commentator concludes that the Constitttion estab.
lishes three independent limitations on police entrapment practices based on self.incrim-
ination, due process, and search and seizure. Note, 74 YALE L.J. 942, 952 (1965).
7. "Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice," Lambert
v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). See also Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963);
In re Anastoplo, 366 U.S. 82, 94 (1960). This requirement cannot reasonably be met when
the state speaks with contradictory voices-one voice from the criminal statute at Issue
and another from the law enforcement officials. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S.
189, 197 (1943).
8. See Model Penal Code, § 2.02(a) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). But see id., Comments 131:
It should be noted that the general principle that ignorance or mistake of law is no
excuse is usually greatly overstated; it has no application when the circumstances
made material by the definition of the offense include a legal element.
Some commentators have dealt with estoppel situations as part of the broader category
of mistake of law. See, e.g., Hall & Seligman, supra note 1, at 675-83; Ryu & Silving, Error
Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. Cim. L. Rav. 421, 436-38 (1957); MODEL PENAL CoIuI.
§ 2.04(3)(b)(iii), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
9. It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not
have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would be
to encourage ignorance where the law-maker was determined to make men know and
obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests of
the other side of the scale.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMION LAw 48 (1881). See p. 1054 infra.
10. The constitutional requirement of precision or clarity in statutory criminal laws
proceeds from the due process notion that an individual ought to be adequately warned
that sanctions will attach to conduct he might contemplate, and that such warning may
not be issued in such a form that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
as to its meaning and differ as to its application." Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926). See also Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Champlln
Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm. of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932); United States v. Cohlen
Grocery, 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1931); Int'l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914); Col-
lins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634 (1914). Aside from the notice requirement, concern over
vague criteria arises from the fear of the potential for government abuse and uncertainty
of application that is afforded. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Watkins
v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., supra at 395. The
vagueness doctrine also derives support from the concern that judicial tribunals ought
to apply statutes within the bounds of construction and interpretation and not be charged
with the essentially law-making function of providing vague legislation with content,
See, e.g., Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Patten v. Alum. Castings Co., 105
Ohio St. 1, 136 N.E. 426 (1922). But see Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). Even
stricter standards of precision are applied where vagueness might result In a chilling
effect on first amendment freedoms. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278
(1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Smith v. California, supra; Nlemnotko
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1915); Herndon v.
Lowry, 801 U.S. 242 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). See Note,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
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rule that the words or actions of its agents cannot estop the govern-
ment has suffered considerable erosion."1 In its application to civil cases,
courts and commentators have long attacked it,12 while in criminal
cases the ex post facto clause-and its due process analog when a high
court has reversed itself on a matter of statutory or constitutional in-
terpretation' 3-embodies principles similar to the estoppel doctrine.
11. See, e.g., Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 46 (1951); United States %. Fox Lake
State Bank, 366 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1966); Stockstrom v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.
1951); United States v. Associated Gen. Contractors of America, 238 F. Supp. 273 (E.D.
La. 1964), rev'd per curiam, 882 U.S. 17 (1965); City of Sheridan v. Montana.Dakota Util.
Co., 157 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.C. Wy. 1958); Gruber v. Mayor of Raritan. 39 N.j. 1, 186
A.2d 489 (1962) (extensive review of authorities); Vogt v. Borough of Belmar, 1.1 N.J. 193.
206-07 (1954); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County, 9 Cal. 2d 624. 630-31 (1937).
However, the state of the law on the application of equitable estoppel principles to gov-
ernments and governmental agencies is presently very uncertain. See K. D.tts, ADtt.%-
LSrPATsvE LAW TPEATISE §§ 17.01-.03 (1958). For cases supporting the view that the govern-
ment cannot be estopped, see, e.g., Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill. 332 U.S. 380, 383 (1917);
Legerlotz v. Rogers, 266 F.2d 457, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Rock v. United States, 279 F. Stipp.
96, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Ameco Electronic Corp., 22-1 F. Supp. 783, 7e6
(EM.N.Y. 1963).
12. See, e.g., K. DAvis, ADMLNIS-RATIVE LxW TREATISE §§ 17.01-.09 (1958); Berger.
Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. CH. L. REv. 680 (195-1); Manning, The Applica-
tion of the Doctrine of Estoppel Against the Government its Federal "Tax Cases. SO N.C.L
R-v. 356 (1952); Newman, Should Official Advice Be Reliable?-Proposals as to Estoppel
and Related Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 374 (1953); Whelan &
Dunigan, Government Contracts: Apparent Authority and Estoppel, 55 Gto. LJ. 820
(1967); Comment, Estoppel Against the Government in California, 4.1 CALiF. L. RPv. 340
(1956); Comment, Estoppel Against State, County, and City. 23 WAst. L. Rrv. 51 (1948).
Various courts and judges have also dealt with the probleni in sonic depth. See cases cited
in note 11 supra. The uniform agreement of commentators that the traditional doctrine
should be discarded is matched by the judicial dissatisfaction with the doctrine demon.
strated in the numerous judicial abridgments of the no.estoppel rule. See 31 C.J.S.
Estoppel §§ 138-46 (1964). Thus, governments are more likely to be estopped when the
litigation has arisen out of their "proprietary" functions rather than their "govern.
mental" or "public" functions, when the government is the plaintiff rather than the
defendant, when the act of the agent relied on was "authorized" rather than "unautho-
rized," when the question is procedural rather than substantive, when it is a subordinate
government or governmental agency rather than a sovereign state or the United States.
and when the government's misrepresentation is b) "action" rather than "inaction."
It is apparent that the more liberal view will gain increasing acceptance. It should be
noted, however, that the demise of the traditional doctrine is not ahtogether a forcgone
conclusion, and the optimism of Professor Davis on this point may be somewhat pre-
mature. See, e.g., Kondo v. Katzenbach, 356 F.2d 351, 863 (1966) (J. Skelly %%*right. J.
dissenting). Judge Wright based his dissent on estoppel grounds and supported hii posi-
tion with ample precedent and scholarship. On appeal the Supreme Court re crsed, sub
nom. Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 500 (1967), but rested its decision on byzantine stat-
utory interpretation. It specifically refused to reach the estoppel issue. In any case, the
growing curtailment of the traditional doctrine does not imply that the government will
uniformly be held estopped by actions that would estop a private party. Rather, the
equities of the situation will be balanced with governmental needs kept in mind. S¢e
United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959); George Ii. Whike Constr.
Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
13. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 862 (1964). Petitioners, "sit-in" demon-
strators, were convicted of refusing to leave private property after being asked to do so
under a criminal statute which proscribed entry on the lands of another after notice pro-
hibiting entry. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of a sub_%quent
decision construing the statute as applicable to the act of remaining on the premises of
another after receiving notice to leave. The United States Supreme Court resers.d, hold-
ing that the statute did not give the petitioners fair notice that their conduct was illegal.
and that the state court's retroactive application of its new construction of the statute
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If the Supreme Court chooses to follow the logic of Raley and Cox,
it must end by replacing the no-estoppel rule in criminal prosecutions
with some sort of due process-estoppel defense. The Court might con-
trive some basis for distinguishing and isolating the two cases: both
have first amendment undertones, Raley involves a conviction for con-
tempt of a state legislative commission-not a common occurrence-,
and in Cox Justice Goldberg's majority opinion pointed out that a
statute prohibiting picketing "near a courthouse" raised some questions
of vagueness.1 4 Yet it is not easy to draw fine and narrow lines around
fundamental concepts of fairness,1 5 and it is not likely that the Court
will want to do so.
On the other hand, constructing a doctrine of criminal estoppel from
the rationale of Cox and Raley is no simple task itself. These two cases
may provide the precedential foundation for such a doctrine,
10 but they
amounted to a denial of due process since it operated exactly like an ex post facto law.
The underlying equitable rationale is similar to criminal estoppel. However, it is tin
realistic to think that the petitioners were relying on the wording of the statute, par-
ticularly since both petitioners expressed a willingness to be arrested and the expectation
that they would be. Id. at 367 (Black, J., dissenting). Also, it seems safe to say that In
1960 a black person about to sit-in at a lunch counter in Columbia, South Carolina,
could reasonably expect to be arrested and convicted of some criminal violation. However,
to make reliance the only relevant question is to ignore half the problem-the contluct
of the state. The majority's recognition of the functional equivalency of such retroactive
application to ex post facto laws adequately characterizes this type of judicial deviation
from the rule of law.
Also note Justice Brennan's statement that the petitioners' conduct was not "improper
or immoral." Id. at 362. In this connection, see Hall & Seligman, supra note 1.
See also James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). James had been convicted of "wil.
fully and knowingly" failing to pay income tax on embezzled funds, and based his defense
on Comm'r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), which held that embezzled funds were not
taxable income. The Supreme Court overruled Wilcox, yet reversed James' conviction.
Three justices rested on the ground that since his actions took place while Wilcox was
still valid, "wilfulness" couldn't be shown, and three others on the gounds that Wilcox
was right when decided. In addition, Justices Harlan ant Frankfurter (who had agreed
on the overruling of Wilcox) voted to remand the case for a new trial in which the gov-
ernment would have to prove that James' failure to pay income taxes was wilful, i.e., that
he did not rely on Wilcox. On the prospective overruling issue generally, see Note, Pro-
spective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YAr I,.j 907,
923-27 (1962). See also Desist v. United States, 37 L.W. 4225 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
14. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568 (1965). The majority admitted that there wa%
"some lack of specificity in a word such as 'near'." However, the Court circumvented this
problem, saying that though the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, it required and
anticipated "a degree of on-the-spot administrative interpretation by officials.' id. This
analysis has been found unpersuasive by at least one commentator. Note, The Supreme
Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REy. 105, 154 (1965). See note 10 supra.
15. On the fundamental nature of due process adjudication and the broad scope of
the Court's power under that clause, see Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause,
116 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1048 (1968).
16. The opinions in Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. '123 (1959), managed to ignore totally
the estoppel implications of that decision. Some cursory mention of the fundamental
nature of the issue can be found in Cox. Mr. Justice Goldberg stated for the majority:
Nor does this limited administrative regulation of traffic which the Court has con-
sistently recognized as necessary and permissible, constitute a waiver of law which is
beyond the power of the police. Obviously telling demonstrators how far front the
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hardly suggest the finished analytic structure. Most importantly, the
opinions fail to take account of the basic policy reasons for the no-
estoppel rule: the doctrine of separation of powers and the fictive pre-
sumption that every citizen knows the criminal law. However much
the rule's urgency has been exaggerated, the policy underlying it is
by no means unimportant and, eventually, must help shape any
emerging theory of criminal estoppel.
I.
Separation of Powers.17-The interests embodied in the criminal law
are public interests of the greatest weight. No official or agency of
courthouse steps is "near" the courthouse for purposes of a pernissible peaceful
demonstration is a far cry from allowing one to commit, for example, murder, or
robbery.
379 U.S. at 569.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Black stated categorically that "a police chief cannot authorize
violations of his State's criminal laws." Id. at 582. However. the cases cited in support of
this broad statement demonstrate that support for Black's position is as difficult to muster
as its opposite. All three are antitrust cases; and only Soconv is a criminal prosecution:
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-52"(1963); California v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 484-85 (1962); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.. 310
U.S. 150, 225-27 (1940).
In Socony the defendants had offered to prove the encouragement, cooperation and
acquiescence of the Federal Petroleum Administration in the bu)ing programs the de-
fendants had inaugurated in order to stabilize the price of refined gas. The trial court
rejected the offer and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that the National
Industrial Recovery Act set up a mechanism for securing immunity for such programs
from the Sherman Act. The defendants eschewed that mechanism while it was operative.
and the scheme continued after the expiration of the NIRA. It is reasonable to read the
case as one in which the agency had "alerted defendants that their conduct would be
considered unlawful unless formal approval were obtained." (as the district court did in
United States v. Associated Gen. Contractors of America, 238 F. Supp. 273. 283 (E.D. La.
1965)), although the Court in Socony specifically refused to rest on this ground. The
Supreme Court reversed per curiam in Associated General, 382 U.S. 17 (1965). citing
Socony and Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States. 345 U.S. 594. 623-24 (1953). ("Doubt-
less, long-tolerated trade arrangements acquire no vested immunity under the Sherman
Act; no prescriptive rights accrue to the prosecutor's delay.')
The decisions in Cox and Raley certainly curtail the scope of the language in Socoav
relied on in the per curiam reversal. If the Socony principle is to be considered Niable
today, it must be due to the peculiar characteristics of the antitrust field or the limited
reading of the case that the district judge gave it in Associated General.
Certainly Associated General is not the vehicle to reinstate the no-estoppel doctrine
even in the antitrust field. The district court used estoppel language, but the decision is
erroneous on any basis and should be deemed a sport. The judge brought the estoppel
issue up sua sponte based on a single document submitted by the government for another
purpose. The question the government presented on appeal was whether the government
is estopped from prosecuting someone criminally solely becuse, after previously investi-
gating the activity, it did not institute civil or criminal suit thereon. This is a fair state-
ment of the record. The government had investigated the Association ten years prior to
this action and issued no statement or indictment. The Association argued in its brief
that the case was covered by Cox and that the appeal should be dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question. Nothing in Cox or this Note covers sud a case since there
was no inducement, no widespread nonenforcement, no advice, and probably no reliance.
The case deserved the summary reversal the Court gave it. See Case Note. 196 DuKE
L.J. 649.
17. The traditional formulation of the doctrine of separation of powers dictates that
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government has the authority to waive the public interest,' and so
none-save the legislature-can define the limits of the criminal law.
A defense of criminal estoppel would in effect permit the individual
official to alter or suspend the statutory penal law simply by mis-
interpreting it.19
Justifying the rule against estopping the government in terms of
separation of powers, however, is only a formal expression of the belief
that the criminal law is too serious a matter to allow law enforcement
officials to make mistakes as to what it covers. If the individual is
unsure where the boundary of lawful conduct lies, he should "steer
wide of the unlawful zone" rather than seek official advice as to how
far he might legally go. This makes a great deal of sense where the
prohibited conduct threatens grave injury to persons or property or
a serious disruption of the economy, but the no-estoppel rule has tra-
ditionally been applied without regard to the gravity of the offense
and its probable consequences. 20 The criminal law has become ex-
tse legislative branch retain exclusive power to make the law. "All legislative powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of
a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CoNsr. art. I. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
However, numerous institutional compromises have been grafted onto this model. See
generally C. BLACK, PERSPECriVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56-64 (1963); A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 159-61 (1962); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAl, CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 28-86 (1965); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINIsTRTIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.01-.16 (1958); Jaffe,
An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: 11, 47 COLUm. L. REv. (19-17).
18. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 582 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). See note 16
supra. See generally articles cited note 12 supra.
19. As the law now stands, police and other law enforcement officers have not been
delegated discretion not to invoke the criminal process for violations within the "full
enforcement area." J. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Criminal Juslice, 69 YALE L.J. 5,13,
577-80 (1960) [hereinafter cited as J. Goldstein]. For a graphic illustration of the level of
actual enforcement, see id. at 563; THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FuEE Socrnv, A Rr-
PORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COM, MISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADAINISTRA'rION OF JUSTICE
8-9 [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE].
20. Despite the strength of the no-estoppel rule, scattered state cases indicate that the
principle of criminal estoppel is gaining some acceptance. See, e.g., People v. Ferguson,
134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P.2d 965 (1933). The court reversed conviction for violation of state
securities statute for failure to get a permit to sell certain interests in a land development
scheme. The trial court had rejected the defendant's offer to prove that lie had been in
doubt as to whether the scheme was covered by the statute and had received a ruling
from the corporations commissioner that the land interests were not "securities" and thus
no permit was needed. But see Western Surgical Supply Co. v. Aflleck, 110 Cal. App. 2d
388, 242 P.2d 929 (1952). See also Market Street Ry. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 137
Cal. App. 2d 87, 290 P.2d 20 (1955); State v. Ragland, 4 Conn. Cir. 424, 233 A.2d 698
(1967) (discussed at note 73 infra; People v. Donovan, 27 App. Div. 2d 957, 279 N.Y.S,2d
404 (1967) (discussed at note 80 infra); People v. Markowitz, 18 N.Y.2d 953, 223 N.E.2d
572, 277 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1966) (defendant made various attempts to get a peddler's license
to sell scorecards at ballpark, but was told by licensing officials that it wasn't necessary;
later he was convicted of unlicensed peddling, but the New York Court of Appeals re-
versed per curiam on the basis of Cox); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 158 Pa. Super. 198,
44 A.2d 520 (1945) (where the local practice had been to issue two subpoenas for atten-
dance of Commonwealth witnesses, one for the grand jury and another for the trial, an
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tensively used as an instrument of social control with a complex,
sometimes labyrinthian administrative structure. Where an individual
has relied upon the enforcement agency's interpretation of a highly
technical law,21 or obeyed the reasonable order of someone with ap-
parent authority to give it,22 allowing the government to disclaim the
action of its agent seems not only unjust, but unnecessary to the proper
functioning of the criminal process and to any rational theory of the
allocation of power between different branches of government.
The Presumption of Knowledge of the Law.-Courts refusing to
apply estoppel against the government in civil cases often state that
the citizen is charged with knowledge of the statutes and regulations
relevant to the transaction.23 In the criminal area, the common law
enshrined this notion in the rule that ignorance of the law is no ex-
cuse for breaking it.2 4 Though the presumption was admittedly a
individual had a right to rely on the custom; though the defendant was unable 
to appear
at the grand jury due to illness, and it was not legally necessary to send two subpoenas,
the judgment of conviction for failure to obey the one subpoena was reversed); People 
v.
Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779, 9-52 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1904) (memorandum decision).
conviction rev'd, 50 Misc. 2d 751, 271 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (discuissed at note 10
infra).
21. See People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P.2d 965 (19331).
22. See State v. Ragland, 4 Conn. Cir. 424, 233 A.2d 698 (1967).
23. See, e.g., Fed'l Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). The plaintiff applied
for a wheat crop insurance policy from the FCIC through the county committee, dis-
dosing to them that part of the crop was reseeded winter wheat. The branch office 
of
FCIC approved the policy on the county committee's recommendation. When the plaintiff
tried to recover under the policy, the FCIC refused to pay, based on a Wheat Crop Insur-
ance Regulation that precluded insurance for reseeded wheat. The county committee had
misled plaintiff to believe the entire crop was insurable, and plaintiff had no knowledge
of the regulation. The Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict for tile plaintiff saying that
private parties are bound to know the law regulating government agents.
It is more reasonable to charge the citizen with knowledge of tie law in a criminal
case since the relevant law proscribes the conduct by the individual rather than regulating
the power distribution within the government. See note 16 supra, especially United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
24. See note 9 supra. See generally Hall & Seligman, supra note 1.
Austin felt that the question of whether the defendant was actually ignorant of the
law was so difficult to solve that the adjudication of the i sue would be impractical or
impossible. J. Austin, JuRlsPRLDEIcE § 699, at 342 (Campbell ed. 1875). As Holmes pointed
out, this rationale for the rule is entirely insufficient:
[The presumption] has accordingly been defended by Austin and others. on the
ground of difficulty of proof. If justice requires the fact to be ascertained, tre diffi-
culty of doing so is no ground for refusing to try.... [NJow that parties can testify,
it may be doubted whether a man's knowledge of the law is ar.7 harder to investigate
than many questions which are gone into. The difficulty, such as it is. would be met
by throwing the burden of proving ignorance on the law-breaker.
O. V. HOLMES, THE Co.No LAW 48 (1881).
Objections to this position are no more persuasive than Austin's original statement.
See, e.g., Hall & Seligman, supra note 1, at 647-48. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355
U.S. 225 (1957), where the Court eschewed the common law principle that ignorance of
the law will not excuse, and held that an ex-convict who failed to register as a convicted
person under an ordinance requiring registration could not be held criminally liable for
the failure absent actual notice of the ordinance. Due process requires notice in these
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fiction at common law, the diversity of American society and the
explosion of statutory crimes has divorced the fiction from reality
entirely.
In fact, the criminal process has not for some time been the simple
mechanism which the no-estoppel rule presupposes. Legislatures con-
tinually pass criminal statutes that require interpretation 2r and out-
right policy-making by administrative officials. Separate agencies may
share responsibility for enforcing the same body of law. Even the
police, working with many broadly-framed laws and limited resources,20
make refinements in the law that the legislature may not have in-
tended.2 7 An individual, confronted with the practices and views of
the enforcement agency, has little means of discovering whether the
prosecutor-much less the legislature-knows or agrees with how the
law is being administered. In light of such state-sponsored confusion,
government insistence that the citizen should know the true state of the
law is at best unreasonable.
2 8
Reasons which might justify the no-estoppel rule in some cases,
therefore, do not apply in many others, while the reason for an estoppel
circumstances because the "conduct" was wholly passive and the defendant had no knowl-
edge of any wrongdoing.
The presumption is also overcome in other situations. Where the Court determines
there was a lack of mens rea, there is no conviction. See note 77 infra. Similarly, the legis-
lature may require more than the presumption or a general intent to do the acts, e.g.,
by requiring a specific intent to violate the law, that the acts be done "wilfully." See
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221 (1961); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389
(1933).
25. The statute involved in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), is an example. The
classic example is the normal breach of the peace statute. See H. Goldstein, Police Dis-
cretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 PUBL. ADMIN. REv. 140, 142-43 (1967); Remington &
Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. lii. L. Fortum 481,
485-93 (1960).
26. See J. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 560-62; H. Goldstein, supra note 25, at 142-43.
27. These decisions have a wide impact on the attitudes of citizens toward the criminal
law, law enforcement, and government generally. See CHALLENGE, supra note 19, at 91-95,
99-101; Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, l144 (1953): W.
LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 89-91, 148-19, 155-56
n.16 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE]; Williams, Turning a Blind Eye, 1954 CRIM. L.
REv. 271.
These distinctions or refinements may be rational ones based on sound policy determfina-
tions. But see, e.g., J. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 553, particularly n.17; Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d
128 (1962); and note 108 infra. But even rational enforcement distinctions may operate
against the goals of the criminal process or the legislative will. See J. Goldstein, supra
note 19, at 562, 567-73, 576-77, 582-86.
28. If the main basis for the presumption is the state's need "to make men know and
obey," the fact that the executive arm of the state has interposed a different standard for
obedience, a standard including the threat of immediate enforcement as well as the power
to grant effective immunity, vitiates the rationale for the presumption. See Hall & Selig.
man, supra note 1, at 649; MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.04(3)(b) and comments, at 17-18, 138.39
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See also Ryu & Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative Study, 24
U. CHm. L. Rv. 421, 436-38 (1957).
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defense applies in all.2 Moreover, recognition of a criminal estoppel
defense would focus attention on interstitial law-making by enforce-
ment agencies,30 providing the legislature a more realistic view of the
criminal process3 and enabling different branches of the government
to better coordinate their roles in administering the criminal lawY.-'
The question, then, becomes not whether the courts should accept a
defense of estoppel, but how far it should extend-in short, a question
of what kind of reliance on what kind of official mis-representation
should estop the state from prosecuting a person for what kind offense.
II.
Because a plea of estoppel would constitute a special excuse for a
criminal act and would often involve facts peculiarly within the de-
29. The suggestion for an estoppel defense contained in this Note is not altogether
original, but it does go considerably beyond earlier proposals. See Comment. Estoppel
Against the Government in California, 44 CALIF. L. REx. 340, 342-4-. 352-53 (1956). for a
section of a proposed statute on estoppel that would deal with a limited number of the
situations discussed herein. See also People v. Donovan, 53 Misc. 2d 687, 279 N.Y.S.2d 40-1
(Spec. Sess., Westchester 1967); Case Note, 81 HAns'. L. REv. 895 (1968); authorities cited
note 8 supra.
30. On the need for judicial review of law enforcement officers' discretion in order to
assure that the rule of law prevails, see LkFAvE 68-72; H. Goldstein, Administrative
Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J. CRI.M L.C. & P.S. 160,
168-69 (1967) (excellent summary of various efforts to obtain review and the problems
involved); LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Alahing
and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 ,Miin. L. Rrv. 987 (1965): LaFave, mn-
proving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule, 30 Mo. L. IRrv. 391 (1966).
31. Professor Goldstein concludes that the ultimate answer is not to legitimate police
discretion and make attempts to control it through review, but rather to eliminate police
discretion and strive for full enforcement. The hope is that this would either force real
reform of the statutory criminal law or follow such reform. See J. Goldstein, supra note
19, at 560-62, 586-89. Whatever the validity of this view in regard to police, it seems
impossible to endorse with respect to agencies, prosecutors and other law enforcement
officers. In any case, the theoretical possibility of full enforcement is not dealt with here.
The various judicial and scholarly justifications for enforcement discretion seem per-
suasive, and the emphasis here is on obtaining review of such discretion in order to curb
abuses. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569 (1965); CHALLENGE, supra note 19. at 106:
TASK FORCE REPORT- THE POLICE 18; H. Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal J'erstus
the Real, 23 PUB. Aa.nrm. REv. 140, 146; United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1963);
Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
32. Since criminal estoppel would result in a complete defense, the judicial determina-
tion of police misrepresentation should have some impact on police practices. It might
force the police to re-examine the amount of discretion left to individual officers. For a
discussion of why police departments are reluctant to formulate such policy now, ee
CHALIENGE, supra note 19, at 103-04; LaFave, 493-95; H. Goldstein, Police Discretion: The
Ideal Versus the Real, 23 PUB. ADMN. REv. 140, 143-45.
The judiciary is the best institution now available for considering the delicate isues
involved. The courts are situated at the proper stage of the process for determining
whether the accused has reasonably relied on official action or inaction because: (1) the
police and prosecutor have had an opportunity to consider the propriety of their actions
against the person, and (2) the principle is directly analogous to civil estoppel which the
judiciary has dealt with over a long period of time. Being somewhat more imnne from
the political pressure and tensions of law enforcement than the police and prosecutor.
courts are better able to render considered decisions on the fairness of police and prose-
cutorial decisions and the reasonableness of the defendant's claimed reliance on officials'
misrepresentations.
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fendant's knowledge 33 it would properly be an affirmative defense. 4
The defendant would bear the burden of coming forward with con-
vincing evidence that the government had misled him, and the jury
would decide whether he had actually acted in reliance on some offi-
cial word or deed.3 - The reasonableness of this reliance,30 however,
determined in light of the policies weighing both for and against
estoppel, would be an issue of law, since the courts will be defining
the limits of the defense by specifying the circumstances in which
reliance is justifiable.
37
33. Those facts peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge would be those relating
to his actual reliance-the knowledge of the pertinent law he had at the time of viola.
tion, what he heard the law enforcement officer to say, his belief in the advice or direc-
tions and his reliance thereon. However, in many cases highly important data might be
just as "peculiarly" within the knowledge of the prosecution or police department, e.g.,
enforcement patterns, policy directives, the orders the law enforcement official was acting
under. In such situations, ample discovery should be provided. See, e.g., People v. Harris,
182 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1960).
34. Cf. 31 C.J.S,, Estoppel § 63 at 397; § 75 at 453; 153(1) at 743-49 (1964). Tie criminal
estoppel defense is heavily fact-oriented. Thus, the issue must be tried to the jury in
some form. However, the prejudice to the defendant involved in trying the issue to the
jury could be nearly as great as that involved in trying the entrapment issuc to the jury.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10(2), Comment 5 at 14, 21-22 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
35. Since the defense is affirmative, the burden would seem to be best left with the
defendant. However, the prosecution traditionally has the burden of proving all the
elements of a crime "beyond a reasonable doubt." Moreover, the prosecution clearly has
better access to the evidence on one half of the defense--official misleading; but the ie-
fendant has better access to the evidence on the other half-his own reliance. Tile treat-
ment of burden of proof for the insanity defense is of some assistance here. The defendant
raising the insanity defense bears the burden of coming forward with evidence on the
issue, the "production" burden. In half of the states and the federal courts, the defendant
can satisfy this burden by presenting "some evidence" of insanity. By doing so, the de-
fendant shifts the burden of production (as well as the persuasion burden) to tie prose-
cution, which must present sufficient evidence of sanity to convince reasonable men beyond
a reasonable doubt. The prosecution also bears the "risk of non-persuasion," thouglh In
a majority of states the defendant is said to have to prove his insanity by a preponderance
of the evidence. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANrrY DEFENSE 110-15 (1967). Though the de-
fendant can carry the issue to the jury by presenting "some evidence" (and Prof. Gold-
stein indicates that this standard is liberally interpreted), he must demonstrate Insanity
by a preponderance of the evidence in order to get a directed verdict. The prosecution's
burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt is conceptually distinct.
There is some argument for applying this allocation in a criminal estoppel situation.
However, the state's ease of access to evidence of misleading requires some variation. The
proper solution would seem to be: (1) that the defendant should initially bear the pro-
duction burden on both questions--misleading and reliance; (2) that if the defendant
presents "some evidence" on both elements, the production burden and the burden of
persuasion is placed on the prosecution on the question of misleading; (3) that the de.
fendant retains the production burden and the burden of persuasion on the question of
his own reasonable reliance; (4) that the standard for a directed verdict should be that
the defendant must prove his estoppel defense by a preponderance of the evidence unless
the evidence presented raises a reasonable doubt as to intent or mens rea or another
element of the crime, On mens rea, see note 77 infra.
36. Cf. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 67 (1961).
37. Since the criminal estoppel defense is based on due process, a matter of law, tile
trial court must exercise close supervision over the treatment of the entire issue. Where
undisputed testimony demonstrates all the elements of the defense, or the defendant proves
the elements of the defense by a clear preponderance of the evidence, the court shoulid
grant a directed verdict for the defendant. Where testimony on one or more elements of
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Before a court can judge whether reliance on official misleading was
justifiable, it will have to consider all the circumstances under which
reliance is claimed.38 Because the estoppel defense rests on due process
notions of fairness to the individual, an abstract "reasonable man"
standard that ignores individual characteristics will not do:39 the socio-
economic, educational, and cultural traits of the defendant, as well as
those of the community in which he lives,4 0 are no less relevant to
the defense conflicts, mandatory instructions should be given tile jury. See Moonr. Pnxv,%L
CODE § 2.04(4) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
38. Cf. Bealle v. Nyden's, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 86, 92-5 (D. Conn. 1965) for an example
of a trial judge's treatment of all the facts and inferences available concerning the plain-
tiff's reliance in a civil equitable estoppel claim.
39. This insistence on an individualized standard for reliance comports with the Su.
preme Court's view of the due process mandate in another sensitive are of police prac-
tices--interrogations. Prior to the promulgation of the Miranda rules, the Court's test
for the admissibility of confessions obtained by police interrogation was "voluntariness,"
whether the defendant's will was overborn by the police conduct in questioning him.
This seemingly objective standard became highly personalized in application. For e.x-
ample, in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 438 (1958) the Court states:
[The possibility of coercioni is negated here by petitioner's age [31]. intelligence, and
education. While in law school he had studied criminal law; indeed, when asked to
take the lie detector test, he informed the operator that the results of such a test
would not be admissible at trial absent a stipulation by the parties.
The Court then distinguished an earlier case that held that due process was violated.
House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945), because there the defendant was "an uneducated man"
and a "stranger to the area." Another contrast to the Crooher determination is Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-23 (1959), where the Court noted that the defendant was
foreign-born, only 25 years old, had no criminal record or exposure to police questioning.
had finished only one-half year of high school, and had a history of emotional instability.
before holding that the use of the confession solicited from him by the police through
his "childhood friend" violated due process.
This individualized standard departs somewhat, however, from the normal treatment
of reliance in civil estoppel and the mythical "reasonable man" of tort law. But it is
apparent that the abstract "reasonable man" does take on a very large number of the
features of the defendant in a civil suit:
It would appear that there is no standardized man; that there is only in part an
objective test; that there is no such thing as reasonable or unreasonable conduct
except as viewed with reference to certain qualities of the actor-his physical attri-
butes, his intellectual powers, probably, if superior, his knowledge and the knowledge
he would have acquired had he exercised standard moral and at least a%erage mental
qualities at the time of action or at some connected time.
Seavey, legligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 27 (1927). See generally
W. PRossma, THE LAW OF TORTS 153-83 (3d ed. 1964). Whatever the benefits of the totally
objective reasonable man might be in determining liability in civil matters (where the
objective is to compensate victims and hold all citizens to a reasonable standard of care).
the requirements of due process in the criminal estoppel situation should be made to
turn on the reasonability of the defendant's reliance, since the objective here is to pre-
vent the stigma of a criminal conviction from attaching to a person who has relied on
the advice or directions of the executive officials. Cf. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41
(1951).
40. Significant practical difficulties, as well as definitional problems, are presented in
determining a defendant's "community" and the community's "mores." Certainly the
relevant community should not be considered to be as large as a state juriscdiction in
most cases, nor as small as the defendant's private circle of friends or peer group. In a
modern urban context the notion of a physically definable community of mutually de-
pendent actors with shared values and norms has only an attenuated meaning. The con-
gruent social, economic, political and ethical worlds of the agrarian town have disappeared;
thus, there is substantial difficulty in determining the folkways or fundamental moral
standards of conduct of citizens. Despite these problems, as long as the relevant com-
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determining whether the individual should have relied than to deter-
mining whether he actually did. At the same time, a standard of justi-
fiable reliance cannot disregard society's interest in strict observation
of the criminal law.41 Where the defendant knew that his acts were
illegal, he must face a heavy presumption that reliance was not rea-
sonable.42 The judge's task is to decide when, even after the official
misleading involved in the case, the individual still has a duty to know
the law.
Clearly, a mere expectation that the government will not prosecute
does not raise the defense. 43 A defendant who, for reasons not generally
applicable, has received "license ' '44 to violate the law from those
charged with enforcing it cannot validly claim estoppel. The purpose
of criminal estoppel is the protection of those whom the government
has confused as to the state of the law; and collusion, bribes, and
favoritism by officials are outside its scope-no matter how much the
defendant may have relied on such misconduct. ' 5
Beyond this, however, a court can fashion few hard-and-fast rules
for an estoppel defense. To rule on the reasonability of reliance, the
court must juggle a complex set of factors. Besides the defendant's
personal characteristics, it must weigh in the balance the gravity of the
munity is dealt with as a function of the characteristics of the individual involved rathei
than according to such arbitrary classifications as political boundaries, the import of the
factor of community standards can be preserved. Cf. Hall & Seligman, supra note 1.
The relationship of the defendant's conduct to his community's standard of conduct
may not always be helpful in determining whether reliance is reasonable. Where the
person knowingly adheres to community mores, this should be some evidence of the
reasonability of his reliance on official misleading. Where the defendant was not aware
of the illegality of his acts, his deviation from community mores should not be considered
to establish an "intent to deviate" that seriously jeopardizes the reasonability of reliance.
The person's deviation from community mores may have little probative import on the
question of reliance since the community in question may support a strict standard of
conduct and the defendant may not endorse it or even be particularly aware of it.
41. See pp. 1051-52 supra.
42. Actual knowledge of illegality does not here require that the defendant have attual
knowledge of a specific statute or statutes, but rather that he know his conduct is illegal
in a functional sense, i.e., that under normal circumstances the proposed conduct would
legitimately result in arrest and conviction if observed by law enforcement officials. Whee
the statute is vague or broadly phrased this type of knowledge would be more dtlfficult
to demonstrate. Where there is a selective nonenforcement policy or the statute has
fallen into desuetude, such functional knowledge of the statute would be requircd to
raise the presumption. Cf. Ryu & Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. CH.
L. REv. 421, 459 (1957).
43. See the discussion at note 16 supra of United States v. Associated Gen. Contractors
of America, 238 F. Supp. 273, 283 (E.D. La. 1965), rev'd per curian, 382 U.S. 17 (1965).
44. The sense of the term "license" here is "5. exceptional freedom allowed in a special
situation. 6. excessive or undue fr'edom of liberty ... ." THE RINDOM HOUSE DIGIONAnY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 826 (unabridged ed. 1967).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Cerone, 150 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 19.15), where a crhnlnal
estoppel defense would be totally inapplicable since the defendants had colluded with
and bribed the officials involved in the case.
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offense, the ambiguity of the governing law
4" and the degree to which
its definition had been left to the administering agency,
47 the means
by which the government had misled the defendant,
4 8 and the extent
to which a citizen should be charged with knowledge of the internal
workings of government 9 Some, if not all, of these considerations will
also bear on the jury's determination whether the defendant was ac-
tually misled, but the court must look at them in a different light. The
question for it is not what the defendant did, but how great a margin
of error the public interest can permit and due process nay require
in cases like his.50
46. The Court stated in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), that though the 
statute
involved passed constitutional muster on vagueness grounds, some ambiguity 
remained:
"near" a courthouse could have different meanings to different people. See note 1.1 supra.
The Court felt that the statute foresaw an administrative interpretation to darify 
it in a
particular situation. Remington and Rosenblum have stated that tie a erage 
state's
criminal law is permeated with ambiguities and inconsistencies necessitating a 
great deal
of administrative discretion. Some such ambiguities result front legislatise inertia 
or the
ineffective use of language, but others dearly result from legislative cesign-to facilitate
administrative problems, to eliminate possible loopholes, or to deliberately delegate 
policy
decisions to law enforcement agencies. Remington & Rosenbhum. The Criminal Lan
and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481, 483-93 (1960). All of this lends much
support to the arguments for allowing law enforcement agencies to exerdse discretion.
but it also means that the area of functional illegality in mud of the substantie criminal
law has hazy contours indeed. Similarly ambiguous standards are created b) some common
law defenses sud as self-defense or the right to defend one's property with reasonable
force. The result of criminal laws that are ambiguous but not %oid-for-vagueiese. 
see
note 10 supra, is to create a large zone of actions which are possibly criminal where the
private actors will place great reliance on an official's interpretation of legality.
47. For example, courts are muci more indined to allow wide discretion to federal
administrative agencies (in defining the scope of a regulatory statute, in selecting remedies.
and in rule-making) than the) are to recogui7e police discretion in regard to normal
criminal statutes. This may be due to a number of factors: greater faith in the sp cial
competence" of the agency than of the average police department. the realization that
agencies generally initiate the criminal sanction as an incident to economic regulation, and
an awareness that regulatory statutes generally grant rule-making powers to agencies 
that
are not granted to police. See Moog Industries v. FTC, 355 US. 411 (1958); Bryce Motor
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC. 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
Where a defendant relies on misrepresentations of an agency that has a great deal of recog-
nized authority to define the manner and occasions of a law's enforcement, the reason-
ableness of his reliance would seen dear in most cases.
48. Three main categories of official misleading will be dealt with in this Note-bv
order, by opinion and by selective non-enforcement. However, each of these 
categories
admits of any number of nuances such. as whether the misrepresnstation was us ritten 
or
oral, whether the official who misrepresented the law had actual authority to gihe 
a corret
decision. Cf. Comment, Estoppel Against the Government in California, 41 CsuF. L. Rn.
340, 342-44, 352-53 (1956).
49. In some civil cases where courts have refused to apply estoppel against tile govern-
ment, plaintiffs have been held to a very high degree of knowledge of the government.
See, e.g., Federal Corp Ins. Corp. v. Merril, 332 U.S. 380, 383 (1947); note 23 supra.
However, the main thesis of this Note is that due process will not allow a similar 
standard
when a criminal conviction is at stake.
50. Although the courts may be reluctant to allow the estoppel defense in a situation
that could recur with some frequency, eadi case should be dealt with individually; 
if
the requirements of estoppel are met, frequency of occurrence may be material. 
Other
prospective factors, perhaps even the instant decision that an offlcial had 
misled the
defendant and thus created an estoppel (if the next defendant was aware of 
the decision
or should have been), may intervene to make the reliance of later defendants 
on the
same type of misleading unreasonable.
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Nature of the Offense
Common sense suggests that the more serious an offense is regarded,
the more urgent is society's interest in its strict prevention and deter-
rence; for similar reasons, a jury will be less likely to find actual
reliance when the crime is a serious one. The distinction between
mala in se and mala prohibita at first seems to provide an easy line
of demarcation,51 but the clarity of this distinction has eroded over
the years until now it connotes little except an historical contrast
between the old common law crimes and the newer statutory ones.-
For purposes of the analysis here, it seems helpful to differentiate be-
tween crimes involving great physical cruelty and injury;"5 crimes in-
volving substantial personal injury; 54 crimes involving substantial theft
or destruction of property or a serious disruption of the public or
economic order;] 5 vice crimes; 50 and finally violation of regulatory
statutes, "public welfare laws," and minor misdemeanors.Y
Estoppel can never be a valid defense to a charge of an heinous
51. See, e.g., People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P.2d 965 (1933), where the court
mentions the distinction ant, since the securities offense involved was malum prohlbiltun,
allows an estoppel defense.
52. The distinction often seems to embody a gross moral judgment based not oncontemporary standards, but the common law or vague notions of natural law. See Sayre,
Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUMi. L. REv. 55, 70-71 (1933). 1-lowever, it may retain
content for some commentators as a label for those crimes that require mens rea as all
element of the offense as against those that do not. See Hall & Seligman, Supra note 1, at
642.
53. Such "heinous" crimes involve such markedly cruel physical treatment of other
persons as to involve shocking disregard for the dignity of life and person. Murder in the
first degree and second degree, forcible rape, compulsory prostitution, forced addiction, and
sabotage or bombings in reckless disregard of life would fall into this category. Cf. Advisory
Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Sentencing
Act, 9 CRIME & DELIN. 339, 355-6 (1963). This category is in no sense analytically discrete,
and implies a moral judgment about the offensiveness of particular crimes. Rational
discussion of types of crimes requires some such judgment where the qtestion involved
is the reasonability or justifiability of reliance on official misleading.
54. This class of crimes would include all crimes that would be in the category of heinous
crimes, see note 53 supra, but for the absence of the surrounling circumstances that make
those crimes shocking. It also includes manslaughter, negligent homocide, assaults and
such other offenses where real injury to another person takes place.
55. Property taking or damaging crimes should include all crimes such as theft,
shoplifting, burglary, robbery, destroying public or private property, unauthorized major
strikes, price-fixing, etc. where the negligent or reckless disregard of life of the categories
heinous crimes or injury to persons is not involved. See notes 53-54 supra.
56. "Vice" crimes are those which involve conduct the legislature deems morally
deviant although no direct injury is involved to any other person or property such as
narcotics, liquor, sex and gambling laws.
57. These three types of crimes are discussed together because they generally involve
no deviation, or at least no generally acknowledged deviation, from community mores inviolations and because there is usually no direct injury to any person or property involved
in violations. (Financial or other loss can be adequately compensated by civil liability.)
Regulatory statutes should be taken to include health codes, tax laws, securities andcorporations laws, labor statutes, motor vehicle laws and others. Minor crimes Inclutle
breach of the peace, disorderly conduct and other misdemeanors. For an analysis of theterm "public welfare laws" see Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUrt. L. Rov. 55 (1933).
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crime. The consequences of such an offense are so severe and the act
itself so reprehensible that society cannot permit a doubt as to the law
-no matter how well-founded-to serve as an excuse for a violation.
Individuals will never have good cause to approach the "zone of un-
lawfulness" here and the government has every reason to keep them
away from itYs Moreover, the law is rarely ambiguous with regard to
these crimes, and they deviate so far from community morals that
their wrongfulness should be apparent even in the face of official mis-
leading.59 For similar reasons almost any crime involving substantial
personal injury would be outside an estoppel defense. Society has the
strongest interest in preventing these offenses and actual reliance on
official misleading is unlikely in the face of the injured party's uni-
versally recognized moral right to bodily safety. Where the victim has
in some way provoked the crime, however, widely held views on the
right to protect one's own person, property and dignity may create
uncertainty as to the law-especially when the law itself has granted
some legitimacy to such views.
60 Since legal and moral notions about
matters like self-defense have already introduced ambiguity into the
criminal law here, recognizing a claim of estoppel would not seriously
weaken the deterrent force.
The need for deterrence is nearly as great when the offense threatens
serious damage to property or to the public or economic order, but at
this point the law becomes much more ambiguous. Confusion as to
the existence and extent of intangible rights in property can present
many situations where the defendant might reasonably seek and rely
on official advice.61 Serious disturbances of the public order often arise
from the exercise of rights of speech and protest, where the individual
has the sanction of the Constitution in approaching near the zone of
58. This "shocks the conscience" standard is obviously vague, but no court or jury will
have difficult) ascertaining that the defendant's reliance was totally unreasonable 
and
unjustifiable in a given case. The preventive interest of society is so paramount 
as to
render absurd the raising of an estoppel defense.
59. The statement that heinous crimes deviate from community mores would be
circular were it not for the problem of civil disorder. During civil disorder law and
perhaps mores have completely broken down in a significant body of the population in 
a
community. The difficulty this creates for a defense based on a legal doctrine such as
estoppel and the question of reasonable or justifiable reliance is obvious.
It should also be noted that reliance by insane persons is beyond the scope of this
Note, except to point out that the insanity defense and the criminal estoppel defense are
basically inconsistent since legal insanity is defined in terms of lack of control and lack
of knowledge of right and wrong.
60. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04-3.06 and Comments (Tent. Draft No. 8.
1958).
61. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, § 206.10 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) and Comments
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954) at 98.
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unlawfulness.62 Even grave economic offenses may be similar to con-
duct which is lawful as well as profitable.63 Entertaining an estoppel
defense to charges like these would not only import more fairness into
the criminal process, but would reduce undesirable chilling effects of
the substantive law.
The category of vice crimes includes a wide variety of offenses, but
they have in common the purpose of preserving the moral fiber of
those tempted to commit the crime. Because the injury to society is
problematic at best, an individual seeking to comply with these laws
might justifiably rely on official advice and enforcement practices.0t
Moreover, mores in many communities are changing rapidly on mat-
ters involving sex, drugs, liquor, gambling, and the other objects of
vice statutes, thereby out-dating the law and giving further support to
a claim of estoppel. 6
If a criminal estoppel defense were generally available, however, its
importance would be greatest in prosecutions under regulatory statutes,
public welfare laws, and the minor crimes of numerous types and vary-
ing scope which pervade American life. 6 Frequently, these statutes do
62. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). But see, note
16 supra.
64. Such reliance would be even more likely where official advice is coupled with aselective nonenforcement policy. See pp. 1069-72 infra. However, if the acts involved areclearly illegal (e.g., prostitution) and known to be so by the relying party, It is hard tosee how one could reasonably expect that the permission would last beyond the scope ofthat official's power. Where the acts violate community mores, this inference is even more
persuasive. But where the legal question is unclear and community mores also permit
or endorse the acts (e.g., social gambling), reliance absent notice of a policy change should
offer a valid estoppel defense.
On social gambling and the special problems of current practices in this area, see
LAFAVE 89-91, 148-9, 155-6; H. Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real,
23 PUB. ADMiN. REV. 140, 141-2 (1962).
The estoppel defense should not be used as a means to wed police, prosecutor, or ad.ministrative agency to their present policy, but the type of prospective notice to which
these officials should be held in order to change policy is a signiFicant problem. A strictstandard (i.e., that the notice was insufficient if it did not reach the defendant trying toraise the estoppel defense based on the old policy), might well be considered too heavy aburden to place on the government. The standard of notice should, however, reflect the
basis of the estoppel defense, reasonable reliance, and thus demand of the official areasonable effort to use the reasonable means available to notify all persons who can be
expected to be affected by the change of policy.
65. Professor LaFave prefers to conceptualize the situation of nonenforcement ofgambling laws against social gamblers as a case where the legislature made certain conduct
subject to the criminal law to insure against creating a loophole through which seriousoffenders could regularly escape. See LAFAVE 89-91. Thus it could be said that social
gambling is not within the legislative intent. This may provide a justification for a selective
nonenforcement pattern, but it provides no protection for unknowing persons arrestedwhen police "abuse" their discretion and violate the legislative will by following the
clear language of the statute to arrest social gamblers.
66. Such offenses are generally considered less serious in nature and thus less likely to
deviate substantially from community mores. By the same token the defendant's claim oflack of knowledge of the illegality of his acts and his claim of reasonable reliance on
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not so much prohibit harmful conduct as require that perfectly lawful
undertakings be conducted in a particular way, in order to facilitate
government supervision of the activity. These rules-of-the-road laws
usually have little to do with common notions of good and evil, and
the defendant unaware of their existence will get no warning from his
moral instincts that his conduct may be criminal.07 Most important,
such statutes often commit broad rule-making powers and discretion to
the enforcing agency, leaving even the knowledgeable individualu no
other reliable guide to the law. The ambiguity or complexity of many
of these laws only compounds this dilemma. 9 Under these circum-
stances, an estoppel defense, once raised, should be persuasive.
Nature of the Misrepresentation
The second major factor in determining whether reliance on official
misrepresentation was justifiable is the form that such misrepresenta-
tion took. Government long ago grew too large and complex to be
bound in every case by the words or actions of each of its agents.
Often, misrepresentation may result from a miscomprehension of
what the official said or did. Since actual reliance is difficult to dis-
prove after the defendant has shown some misrepresentation-the crim-
inal act itself providing some evidence held that he relied
0-- the de-
fense would become overly subject to abuse were any act of any agent
capable of estopping the government. The court may determine, in
light of the conflicting demands of justice and order, how much knowl-
edge and comprehension of the government agent's actual authority
the defendant should be held to possess."
Estoppel by Order.-The clearest case for justifiable reliance is that
in which a recognized official orders the defendant to perform acts in
violation of the criminal law." - A private individual should not lightly
offidal misleading will both be more credible. Similarly, police and prosecutorial discretion
are more accepted and expected in these areas. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US. 559. 569
(1965); J. Goldstein supra note 19, at 60-62; H. Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal
Versus the Real, 23 PuB. AD.m~. REv. 140, 142-43 (1962). Comment, The Right to
Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. RE%'. 1103, 1119-22
(1961).
67. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 4 Conn. Cir. 424, 233 A.2d 698 (1967); People v.
Markowitz, 18 N.Y.2d 953 (1966), 227 N.Y.S.2d 149, 223 N.E.2d 572 (1966).
68. A defendant experienced in the workings of the law enforcement agency should
naturally be held to a higher standard of understanding of the actual authority of the
agents with which he deals. See also notes 89-90 infra.
69. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. See also People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App.
41, 24 P.2d 965 (1933).
70. See notes 33-35 supra.
71. See notes 39, 68 supra and note 90 and accompanying text infra.
72. There is a certain amount of ambiguity in the term "order" since statements meant
and understood as requests are often phrased in the imperative. An "order" should be
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disregard the reasonable orders of authorized public officials,73 and this
fact alone will usually justify reliance whether or not the defendant
knew the ordered acts were otherwise illegal. Yet an official order can-
not absolve the citizen of responsibility for all acts in compliance with
it: ordered to commit plain murder or robbery74 the citizen must
refuse. Crimes involving substantial physical injury to any person
would seem to deserve similar summary treatment where an estoppel
by order defense is presented.75 Yet such acts may not resemble crim-
inal conduct at all under some circumstances: for example, when a
policeman orders a bystander to help him subdue someone resisting
arrest, the inherent ambiguity of the situation may reach the point
that justifiable reliance on an official order to cause substantial injury
is possible.
Reliance is more clearly justifiable when the acts ordered by the
official do not involve inflicting injury on another. In Schiff v. PeopleO
taken to mean a command that implies a real threat of some sort of punishment, either
legal arrest or positive extra-legal detriment, to the person commanded If the commantld
is not obeyed. See, e.g., note 80 infra. On this basis, an order can be distinguished from all
opinion or request with normative import in that the latter implies only displeasure on
the part of the misleading official with conduct that deviates from the request, or the
possibility of future legal or extra-legal detriment to the relying party.
73. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 4 Conn. Cir. 424, 233 A.2d 698 (App. Div. 1967). A police
officer ordered the defendant to drive his vehicle to police headquarters to post a bond
after the defendant had requested a ride in the police cruiser. Though the defendant dld
not inform the police of the fact, his "right to operate" a motor vehicle in Connecticut
was under suspension. He was later charged and convicted of driving while under suspen-
sion. The Appellate Division reversed his conviction for driving to the police headquarters,
stating:
[V]hen one is affirmatively ordered by a police officer . . . to perform a certain act
and in the performance of that act one violates a statute, a conviction should not
obtain.
Id. at 426, 223 A.2d at 701.
The fact that the defendant first asked to ride to headquarters in tle police cruiser could
indicate that he knew that his license was under suspension and that his driving in
Connecticut was illegal. If this were the case his reliance would appear to be on the
ignorance of the officers rather than on the order to drive to headquarters. The court
avoided this problem by stating that the defendant had no obligation to reveal his motor
vehicle record to the police. Id. at 427, 233 A.2d at 702. This may well be justification for
nondisclosure when the relying party is already under arrest as in Ragland or where the
disclosure would reveal present or past criminal conduct and thus bring self-incrimination
rights into play. However, in the normal situation reliance, and the criminal estoppel
defense, could never be based on a partial disclosure of the relevant facts involved in it
proposed course of conduct. Actually, in Ragland the court was probably relying on the
public interest in rapid obedience to the orders of officers charged with traffic regulation,
a policy embodied in 14 CONN. GEN. STATS. 223.
74. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569 (1965).
75. The relying party should, however, be liable for damages done to a third person
if a reasonable person would have recognized the risk of injury with normal attention and
care. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 289 (1962). The state should also be liable for
damages done to third persons by the relying party based on official misleading. See
RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311. But see 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) (acknowledging liability
for acts done by employees of the government within the scope of their offices); cl. 28
U.S.C. 2680(b) (no liability for exercise of discretionary function, even If discretion Is
abused).
76. 111 Colo. 333, 141 P.2d 892 (1943).
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the conviction of a junkdealer for larceny in retaining stolen property
he had purchased unknowingly was reversed; the appellate court stated
that since the police directed the defendant to hold the property he
lacked criminal intent:
The hold order was a condition imposed by the police for the
benefit of... the complaining witness, and Schiff should not be
penalized for following the instructions of the police, even though
it later develops that the police instructions had no legal basis in
fact. His retention of the property in reliance upon the police
order does not constitute an "intent to steal," which is one of the
essential elements of the crime under the statute.--
Orders by officials with a good deal of discretion in enforcement of
regulatory statutes or by police in regard to minor crimes or vice
crimes 8 offer an all but irresistible case for estoppel. Sufficient discre-
tion makes an official by and large the law-maker, the ordinary citizen
cannot be expected to challenge the legal accuracy of the order and
77. Id. at 336. The court's use of the concept of mens Yea to reserse a conviction
resting on facts that would bring the case squarely within the estoppel defense presented
in this Note raises the question of the degree of overlap between thefe two conceptual
approaches to acquittal. One view of inens rea equates it with culpabilitv of any, kind
necessary for a fair imposition of criminal responsibility and hence sees cases of non-
culpable ignorance of the law as involving basic iens rca principles. see Packer. The
Supreme Court and Mens Rea, 1962 Sup. Gr. REV. 107; Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CoNrmrP. PROB. 401, 404-06 (1958). Orthodox mens rea requirements
overlap with the estoppel defense to the extent that official misleading has led a defendant
to a mistaken view of the circumstances of his conduct so that under his 'dew of the
circumstances his conduct is not a crime. This was essentially the situation the court found
in Schiff. See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). Hloweser, the Model
Penal Code treats its limited estoppel defense separately from its general prov ision that
mistake of law is a defense if the mistake "negatives the purpose. knowledge. belief.
recklessness or negligence required to establish a material 
element of the offene. . . "
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(l)(a) and § 2.04(3)(b) Comments at 138-39 (Tent. Draft No. 4.
1955). The rationale for the distinction that is offered in the comments is that the defense
would normally apply to mala prohibila where the penal sanctions are appro-
priate only for deliberate evasion and a single violation does no major public injury. Id.
at 138. In these types of crimes the mens rea requirement is attenuated because the crime
is one of strict liability or presumed intent, and thus the estoppel defense is clharl) tile
preferable rationale. However, there are other cases where presumablN mnus rea could be
shown, but there are sound reasons not to allow a conviction. Cox v. Louisiana. 379 U.
559 (1965); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US. 347 (1964); State v. Jones, 14 N.M. 623, 107
P.2d 324 (1940).
The "wilfulness"' standard has sometimes been read by courts to excuse good faith
errors by defendants about the law whether or not the product of conduct would give rise
to the estoppel defense advocated here. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933):
United States v. Mancuso, 139 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1943). This tack is sometimes woefully
deficient as, for example, in James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221 1(1961), where tie
Court stated that its reversal of an earlier decision (under which the defendant would
not have been guilty of income tax evasion) made it analytically impo'sible to convict
the defendant under a wilfulness standard. Surely an estoppel framework for this decision,
although it does not involve executive misleading and thus is beyond the scope of this
Note, would have been preferable.
In any event, the doctrine of mens Yea provides strong support for the estoppel defenve
presented here. See generally Hall & Seligman, supra note I.
78. See LAF.vm 71 nn.32-33. See also note 64 supra.
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the official's legal power to give it.7M As one judge pointed out in a case
where the police had ordered an obviously drunk defendant to drive
off, and then arrested her for it:
The average citizen does not argue with uniformed authority;
when the law suggests "Move on," the healthy instinct is to get
going. Moreover, one in the defendant's condition cannot be ex-
pected to discuss with reasoned calm the merits and dangers of
proposed action.8 0
Estoppel by Opinion.-When a government agent did not order the
defendant to act, but merely advised or suggested that the conduct did
not violate the law, the issue of justifiable reliance is more difficult to
resolve. The official may have urged a course of action on the defen-
dant, giving his opinion as to the lawfulness of the action some of the
persuasive force of an order,"' or he may only have signified tacit con-
sent. The defendant may have sought out the opinion, or the official
may have announced it unsolicited. The agent whose opinion is put
forward as grounds for estoppel may have been the logical official from
whom to seek advice, -8 2 or he may have had no apparent authority to
79. See note 73 supra.
80. People v. Donovan, 279 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967); Case Note, 81
HARv. L. REV. 895 (1968). Police summoned by a homeowner found an intoxicated motorist
parked in a driveway, and informed the defendant that she was on private property and
would have to leave. They then left and waited down the road until tile defendant drove
out on to the public highway and arrested her for drunken driving. Interestingly,
Section 1102 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of New York makes it an offense to fall to
obey any order of a police officer, but the judge found that the police officer's statements
did not amount to an order. Id. at 406. At this point it "occurred" to Judge Friedman that
estoppel could apply against the state in such a case. Id. at 406.
81. On the facts, Cox probably should be considered as an example of such a normative
opinion. The Chief of Police, who may not even have been aware of the courthouse picket-
ing statute, was apparently saying that the demonstration should be conducted across the
street from the courthouse. This, however, could not be considered an order since Cox
had already refused to obey the Chief's order to turn back. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 571 (1965).
82. Many federal, state and local statutes require the issuance of permits or licenses by
duly constituted public agencies or officials before certain activities can take place. Where
a person has been granted a permit or license, this fact should create a valid estoppel
defense for acts that officials would naturally expect to be performed under the permit
or license which are not otherwise illegal. For example, the issuance of a driver's license
to a person who has answered all reasonable inquiries of the licensing authority and
sought the license in good faith should create a valid estoppel defense for prosecution for
unlicensed driving where it is later discovered that the party is ineligible for licensing.
Where the party is told by the proper authorities that a license is not required for the
proposed activity, this should create a valid estoppel defense for conducting those activities
without the license. People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P.2d 965 (1933); People v.
Markowitz, 18 N.Y.2d 953, 277 N.Y.S.2d 149, 223 N.E.2d 572 (1966).
The apparent authority of the agent is far more important than the actual authority in
determining reasonable reliance in criminal estoppel cases. However, depending on the
knowledge and status of the relying party, it might reasonably be said in some cases that
he knew or should have known the limits of the authority of the agent lie was dealing
with. This is not to say that the government in the criminal area should be bound by the
same standards of apparent authority that a private corporation or partnership is held to.
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offer advice under the law in question. All these variables are impor-
tant to fixing the point at which the government's duty to stand by its
agent's clarification of the criminal law ends and the citizen's duty to
know it begins.
There is, for example, no basis for estoppel if an official's consent to
certain conduct suggests only an offer of individualized immunity from
arrest or prosecution. s3 Policemen sometimes give license to violate
the law, especially in the area of vice and minor crimes." Usually
these cases also involve conduct that is plainly illegal, so that the de-
fendant has no reason to believe that the permission carries any legal
force. Where the official's license is but a particular instance of a gen-
eral policy of nonenforcement,65 however, a valid estoppel claim is
presented.
A similar problem arises where a statute necessarily commits a great
deal of discretion to the enforcement agency, and different officials can
reasonably and properly assess the same situation differently. For ex-
ample, police may visit a party upon complaint and advise those
present not to become louder. Although the noise level remains the
same, other officers later arrive and arrest the host for disturbing the
peace. Unless he was assured by the first officers that his conduct was
unquestionably within the law, the defendant in such a case should
realize he was relying on little more than their individual discretion.,s
Moreover, opinions about such laws as breach of the peace statutes
See generally Whelan & Dunigan, Government Contracts: Apparent Authority and
Estoppel, 55 Gao. L.J. 830 (1967).
83. The purpose of an estoppel defense is to prevent the criminal sanctioning of conduct
performed in reliance on official advice that it was legal or at least not currently punished
as a uniform policy. Official favoritism or unreasonable leniency are not legitimated by the
defense because the essential good faith element is missing-the defendant would know
that the permission is not a legal grant to all persons similarly situated but rather an
extra-legal license that amounts to an abuse of the official's discretion. See notes 44. 45
supra.
84. For example, a policeman might advise combatants to "fight it out" around the
corner, not in public view. He is offering the combatants his own personal immunity from
an assault or breach of the peace charge, not a legal opinion, and his words are probably
understood as just that.
85. See pp. 1069-72 infra.
86. The relevant statutes do not delegate authority to police not to insoke the
criminal process within the "full enforcement" area. See J. Goldstein, supra note 19. at
557-60. However, police discretion is such a widely accepted aspect of the criminal process
that reasonable reliance on reasonable discretion should be considered to be a valid
form of estoppel.
The situations in which police mislead by opinion will usually be infornal queries
addressed to patrolmen or officers. Where this is tie case, the question of whether the
official response was a granting of a "license" rather than a statement as to legality will be
crucial. Where the inquiry is more formal, it is more likely to be addressed to the prosecutor
or district attorney than the police. However, unusual situations such as that in Cox
occur with some regularity in organized protests and incidents of controlled civil dis-
obedience.
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carry the implied qualification that reliance is reasonable only so long
as the situation remains unchanged-and it can change whether the
defendant alters his conduct or not.87
Most cases of estoppel by opinion will involve regulatory and public
welfare statutess8 where the opinions and practices of the administering
agency actually define the scope of much of the law. Recognizing the
need for their advice, many such agencies have institutionalized the
giving of opinions8s and where the defendant has received and followed
advice of this type, he has a compelling claim to an estoppel defense.
On the other hand, a party acting through counsel or experienced
with the agency procedure"0 would have substantial difficulty demon-
87. Thus, to return to the party example, a given noise level may be tolerable at 9:00
p.m. and yet be considered illegal at 2:00 a.m. However, the feature of the situation that
changes sufficiently to make further reliance unreasonable must be a feature that is
reasonably related to the supposed illegality.
88. The fact that laws in this category often involve relatively minor offenses does not
mean that official orders to perform an illegal act may not have serious consequences. The
drunken driver ordered to drive home may kill someone on the way. The slumlord Is
ordered to keep his tenement open in spite of the rats, and a tenant's child may be injured
by rat bites. However, the reasonability or justifiability of reliance should be judged by
the circumstances at the time of the reliance; later fortuitous events may be grounds for
tort liability against the individual or the state, but not a determining factor in criminal
liability. See note 73 supra.
89. For example, the Department of tile Treasury issues guidance to taxpayers under
the authority of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7805. The "advice" comes in the formt of
Treasury Regulations, Revenue Rulings, Revenue Procedures and private determination
letters. See B. BITruR, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIrT TAXATION 25-28 (1961).
Similarly, the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division gives advice on business conduct
in relation to the antitrust laws through its "Business Review Procedure." Antitrust
Division Directive No. 2-68 sets up stringent requirements for the issuance of a business
review letter by the Division: a request for review must be submitted in writing and
can only involve proposed business conduct; the requesting parties "are under an aflirma.
tive obligation to make full and true disclosure"; no oral releases can bind the enforcement
policy of the Division, a business review letter states only the enforcement intentions of
the Division as of the date of the letter and the Division remains completely free to alter
its intention in the public interest (although, the Directive states, the Division "has
never exercised its right to bring a criminal action where there has been full and true
disclosure at the time of presenting the request"); a final caveat states that a failure by
the Division to take action after the receipt of a request and accompanying documents
does not in any way estop the government from taking any appropriate action thereafter.
28 C.F.R. 50.6.
Thus, it is apparent that the Division considers itself not to be binding itself in any wayby issuing a business review letter in regard to business conduct. It has been held that
such clearance does not bind the Division. United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,
253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966). However, Schlitz was a civil action and thus not
related to the criminal defense offered here. On the criminal side, United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 (1940), was the last antitrust case that Involved
an estoppel fact situation. See note 16 supra.
90. Perhaps the greatest instinctive difficulty with a criminal estoppel principle Is Its
application in fields of law where lawyers abound and one can justifiably fear that the
government might be taken advantage of. Obviously, the reasonableness standard for
reliance would be very high where the private party employs legal talent to deal with
the government. Moreover, experienced counsel should be held to have known the actual
authority of the agent with which he is dealing. There is also the question of whether the
party is actually relying on the misleading of the government or the Independent judgment
of his own attorney. It is not necessary that the official misleading be determined to be a
"but for" cause of the offense, but to the extent that the party is relying on counsel the
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strating reasonable reliance on an opinion which did not emerge from
the institutionalized process. 91 Reasonable reliance will usually require
that the defendant obtained his advice by pursuing whatever regular
channels are clearly available.
Whether an opinion of one agency can cross jurisdictional lines to
estop another must ultimately depend on how plainly the lines are
marked. Where the second jurisdiction is a separate government al-
together-as in the case of different states, or the federal government
and a state-the opinion can never have the power to estop.
2 Even
when the party did not know that his acts might violate the laws of
another jurisdiction, the public interest in ensuring that legislatively-
designated administrators of a given statute retain control of its en-
forcement would foreclose the defense. One government cannot be
charged with the responsibility of educating the officers of another,
however likely it is that these officers might render opinions. Normally
the same no-estoppel rule should apply to separate agencies within the
same government.
93
Estoppel by Selective Nonenforcement.-Of course, principles under-
lying the concept of estoppel apply no less to what government officials
do than to what they say. Patterns of enforcement and nonenforce-
ment could well gTound a criminal estoppel defense."
4 Selective non-
enforcement is common to all enforcement agencies,9
5 the practice
estoppel defense is diminished. Reliance on private counsel is not and should not 
be
a defense to a criminal action. Hall & Seligman, supra note 1, at 652-53; R'u and Silving,
supra note 30, at 439.
91. This is the basic fact situation in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
310 U.S.
150 (1940). See note 16 supra.
92. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank. 374 U.S. 321, 350-52 (1963); California
v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482, 484-5 (1962).
93. A possible exception to this rule might be found in cases where separate agencies
have jurisdiction over the same laws, e.g.. the FTC and the Antitrust Division.
94. As stated in Cox and Raley, the due process requirement for a criminal 
estoppel
defense is unequivocal in tile case of an individual misled in all ad hoc situation when
the state, through the executive, is focusing attention on his conduct. llowe'er. 
due
process protection does not favor individuals who were denied their rights in a direct
confrontation with the state as against those who were denied their rights by indirection.
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479 (1963); Johnson v. United States, 318 U-S.
184, 197 (1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The issue is whether the
individual was reasonably misled by inconsistent positions taken by the government, not
"Year Book distinctions between feasance and nonfeasance." Lambert v. California, 353
US. 225, 231 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Certainly, civil estoppel principles do not
recognize such a distinction. 31 CJ.S. Esloppel §§ 72, 87.
95. See J. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 560-62; H. Goldstein, Police Discretion: The
Ideal Versus the Real, 23 PUB. AD.tm. RFv. 140, 142-43 (1963); LAFAvE 61-72, 492-95.
A strict nonenforcement policy is that which exists when the police or proCcutors do
not enforce a given criminal law or laws under any circumstances. Over a sufficiently long
period of time such a law is said to have fallen into desuetude. See Bonfield, The
Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IOwA L. REV. 389 (1964); Poe v.
~Ullan, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). But see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1955);
District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 US. 100 (1953). However. a selective
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going far beyond the inability to investigate and prosecute all violations
because of inadequate resources.00 Police, for example, often choose
not to enforce a statute against classes of violations which they and the
community do not regard as serious. Gambling statutes and some pub-
lic welfare statutes such as housing code violations provide perhaps the
most familiar example of laws enforced selectively for this reason. 7
In other cases, the enforcement agency may regard offenses that fall
below a particular quantum of violation too trival to pursue: tame
drunks and brawlers typically lie below the level of criminal conduct
that police consider worth their notice.98 Whenever the law goes largely
unenforced against a particular class of violations for reasons which
suggest that officials do not really want to sanction these violations,""
nonenforcement policy is that tinder which police do not enforce a given criminal law or
laws against certain types of persons, during certain times of the day, ill certain geo.
graphical areas, or in certain types of factual situations though police are aware of
violations and could enforce the law. See generally LAFAvE 61-164; J. Goldstein, supra
note 19, at 558-59.
Thus, classes of persons which have not been the subject of law enforcement for a par-
ticular statute though there have been noticeable (to the police or prosecutor) violations
may rely on the continuation of that nonenforcement. The problem of determining
identifiable classes is substantial in any given fact situation. However, the misleading of
the citizen by the state and his reasonable reliance are the governing factors in determin-
ing the class. The offense to fundamental fairness involved in official misleading is not
dissipated by the fact that large numbers of persons arc misled; rather, such practices strike
at the heart of fair government. "Engrained in our concept of due rocess is the require-
ment of notice." Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). This requirement cannot
reasonably be met when the executive has contradicted the legislative purpose embodied
in a criminal statute by refusing to enforce it. See LAFAvE 69.
96. See J. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 561-2; H. Goldstein, Police Discretion: Tile Ideal
Versus the Real, 23 PuB. AMMIN. REV. 140, 143-48; H. Goldstein, Administrative Problenis
in Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 160, 163, 171-72
(1967); CHALLENGE, supra note 19, at 103-106; LAFAvE 61-16-I.
Professor LaFave points out that even these financial limitations on law enforcement,
which might be taken as not representing a policy choice on the part of the state, are in
fact the legislative body's policy choice as to the general level of law enforcement tile
comnmunity is willing to pay for. Having granted the law enforcement agencies only scarce
resources with which to maintain "law and order," the legislature is opting for something
less than full enforcement and delegating the policy choices, the selection of priorities
for the limited resources, to the law enforcement agencies.
97. See LAFAVE 89-91, 148-9, 155-56.
98. Professor Goldstein has also pointed out that police sometimes use nonenfoitenlent
tactics where relatively serious crimes are involved: narcotics, "victimless" assaults, anti
rackets violations. J. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 562-89. However, under the principles of
estoppel offered in this Note some of the major examples mentioned would not result In
an estoppel defense. For example, in Goldstein's "victimless" assault example the prosecutor
refused for a time to prosecute assaults where the victim refused to sign a complaint.
Such an enforcement pattern does not create reliance in the citizens subject to it-at least
not reliance that the law will not be enforced at all. Rather the citizen, who in all likeli-
hood knows that the assault is illegal, knows that the question of prosecution vel non will
depend on the victim-and if the victim misleads the defendant as to whether he would
prosecute that is not a due process issue since the state is not involved.
99. This is not to make value judgments about the rationality of fully enforcing any
substantive criminal statute. It is only to say: (1) that the police do not enforce the law
fully, often pursuant to a conscious policy decision; (2) that the community may not
want them to enforce a law fully; and (3) that the community or part thereof, often relies
on the nonenforcement policy.
But, the fact that evidence is presented to show that the class of persons of which
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an estoppel defense should be available to the occasional transgressor
who relies on the enforcement policy and is prosecuted.
Estoppel by nonenforcement has already gained some small recog-
nition under the heading of desuetude. 100 Despite some suggestion that
desuetude could not be found unless enforcement of a statute had
lapsed altogether, the reasons for permitting continuous nonenforce-
ment to serve as a defense press just as strongly when nonenforcement
has been only partial.' 0 ' Nor do sporadic incidents of enforcement
preclude estoppel, so long as the nonenforcement remains notorious
and the few arrests and prosecutions pass unnoticed by the community.
As with estoppel by order and by opinion, the critical element in the
nonenforcement estoppel defense is that some agent of the government
has caused the defendant to believe that his conduct was not considered
outside the law.
Actions, however, can be far more ambiguous in their implications
than words, and not every case of selective nonenforcement will justify
reliance. If the fact that some crimes were difficult to trace, or that the
enforcement agency could not afford to investigate many violations
were enough to estop the prosecutor,'0 2 most of the criminal law would
disappear under the mantle of the estoppel defense. Reliance by price-
fixers on the improbability that the Justice Department will discover
their activity is hardly justifiable. Passive enforcement tactics-that is,
prosecuting an offense only when the evidence is readily available-
should also be insufficient for estoppel,'0 3 unless enforcement becomes
so passive as to appear almost nonexistent.
the defendant presenting an estoppel defense is a member might have reasonably relied
on the enforcement pattern does not excuse the defendant himself from the burden to
show that he himself reasonably relied on the selective nonenforcement pattern.
100. See Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcemnent, 49 IoWA L
R-v. 389 (1964).
101. See note 95 supra.
102. If a criminal statute is enforced against all or most of the violations observed
by police or enforced randomly, no reliance defense should be upheld even though the
police have adopted an enforcement policy not to investigate for violations of the law
which perhaps doesn't catch the largest part of the violations. However. where the en-
forcement practice is not to arrest for certain types of violations of a law unless for ulterior
motives (see note 106 infra; LAFAvE 144-152) even when they are observed, the defense
should be upheld where reliance is shown.
See Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 255 U.S. 411, 413 (1958) where the Supreme Court
upheld the right of the FTC to proceed only against major violators because of inadequate
resources for full enforcement:
[T]he commission alone is empowered to develop that enforcement policy best
calculated to achieve the ends contemplated by Congress and to allocate its available
funds and personnel in such a way as to execute its policy efficiently and economically.
A random enforcement policy almost by definition cannot create reasonable reliance of
nonenforcement against any person or group within the population governed by the statute.
The crux of the problem is in assuring that the enforcement pattern is actuall) random in
something approaching the mathematical use of that term.
103. See note 102 supra.
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As a general rule, there would never be an occasion for estoppel
when the pattern of selective nonenforcement appears to reflect some-
thing other than an official belief that the purposes of the law did not
call for enforcement against certain types of violations. During a riot, for
instance, police toleration of looting does not support justifiable re-
liance because the thief should well know that the general turmoil
alone-not official approval of his acts-protects him. 104 On the same
plane, the immunity from arrest and prosecution that racially-moti-
vated crimes often enjoy in some parts of the South has no weight for
the purposes of estoppel: there it is not the conduct that the police
think unworthy of their attention, but the victims. 10
Perhaps the strongest case for a defense of estoppel is one in which
the occasional arrest and prosecution is based on reasons completely
external to the offense itself.'0 Police may invoke the laws against
drunkenness or vagrancy only when they have violators whom they
want to harass, interrogate, or simply remove from the streets., Minor
criminal statutes may serve as means of oppressing and intimidating
classes of people whom the police dislike. In the latter situation, the
estoppel defense can rest equally on due process and equal protection
principles.
0 8
104. See p. 1070 supra.
105. In different circumstances, perhaps only where very minor offenses are Involved,
totally illegitimate enforcement criteria (such as race) may give rise to reasonable reliance
by that class against whom the statute is not enforced. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 182 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1960), where a group of blacks were prosecutedti under
anti-gambling statutes. The defendants offered to prove that there was a police policy of
concentrating gambling investigations in black areas, disproportionate prosecutions of
blacks relative to the population figures and non-enforcement in instances where police
knew that whites were violating the law. The Appellate Department reversed conviction
on the ground that the trial court should not have denied the offer of proof of a denial
of equal protection of the laws. The case presents a particularly difficult example of the
burden of proof that the defendant raising an equal protection defense must bear. See
Comment, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 1103, 1120-1131 (1961). However, the criminal estoppel
defense would be available to white persons able to show reliance on the enforcelmlent
pattern.
106. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1961),
and 50 Misc. 2d 751, 271 N.Y.S.2d 447 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 1966), reversing the second
conviction. Defendant Walker demonstrated at the second trial that she was intentionally
discriminated against in her prosecution for housing code violations after sihe had publicly
exposed the corruption in the Department of Buildings in regard to Code enforcement.
In the second decision this was determined to be a denial of equal protection of the laws.
However, this might also be an excellent example of the applicability of the criminal
estopple defense where selective nonenforcement has created reliance in certain classes of
persons. Defendant Walker was not given the normal amount of time to correct violations
in order to avoid prosecution.
107. See LAFAVE 149-50. The arresting of a "bad actor" for reasons other than the
specific offense involved is one of a number of practices which he discusses under the
rubric, "Arrest in Cases in Which the Process is Not Ordinarily Invoked." Id. 141-52. Each
presents a separate set of considerations for an estoppel defense.
108. In order to raise a successful equal protection defense to a criminal prosecution
under a statute fair on its face, the defendant must show: 1) that the police intentionally
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The development of a full-blown defense of criminal estoppel would
bear two interrelated advantages for a rational system of criminal jus-
tice. First, the defense would assure a decent standard of fairness for
citizens who detrimentally rely on official misrepresentations. Second,
it would provide an adequate standard for judicial review of the broad
executive discretion granted to the administrators of the criminal law.
discriminated against him or his class; and 2) that the classification made by the police
was an unreasonable one in terms of the subject matter of the statute. Comment, The
Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 CoLU.Nr. L. RM'. 1103,
1113-1122 (1961). Thus, the defendant must first show something more than "mere non-
enforcement of the statute against others similarly situated." DiMaggio v.. Brown, 19
N.Y.2d 283, 291, 225 N.E.2d 871, 279 N.Y.S.2d 161, 167 (1967). Often it is said that the
defendant must show "an evil motive causing the statute to be discriminatorily applied."
United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318, 3-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Having demonstrated tile
intentional selectivity or discrimination in enforcement, the defendant must still show that
the classification that the police or agency has made is unreasonable, "an unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Oyler v. Boles, 36S U.S.
448, 456 (1962). A reasonable classification is apparently one that the legislature could
have made in the statute itself under the usual "rational connection" test. See Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Com'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Taylor v. City of Pine Bluff, 266
Ark. 309, 289 S.W.2d 679, cert. denied, 552 US. 894 (1956). The following cases are exam-
ples of successful employment of the defense: People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E2d
779 (1964), 952 N.Y.S.2d 96; id., 50 Misc. 2d 751, 271 N.Y.S.2d 4-47 (App. Div. 1966),
(reversing the second conviction); People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d Sup. 837. 5 Cal. Rptr.
852 (1960); Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 29 U.5.L.W. 2002 (Phila. City C.P. June
10, 1960), aff'd, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962).
However, criminal estoppel is based on a wholly different rationale than the equal
protection defense. Where there are two classes of persons, A and B, subject to the
prohibitions of a statute, and A is discriminated against by the police while B has not
had the statute enforced against it, defendants in class A will have a valid equal protection
defense where the discrimination is intentional and the A-B classification is unreasonable.
However, defendants in class B who can demonstrate reasonable reliance will always have
a criminal estoppel defense whether or not the classification is reasonable (and though
they might also be able to raise an equal protection defense in some circumstances; see
the Walker case supra). Criminal estoppel goes to the fairness of the notice of illegality
that the defendant had in the selective nonenforcement situation, rather than the equal
protection clause's mandate of equal justice.
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